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I. INTRODUCTION
Conducting resource extraction in failed states, conflict zones, and
countries with poor human rights records (collectively, "regions of
concern") raises a number of profound moral and ethical concerns. Not
only might human rights abuses be committed in the resource recovery
process (such as by the displacement of local populations or the use of
forced labor), but royalty payments by extractive industry corporations
might also bankroll oppressive governments and their military machines.
In their article, Matthew F. Smith and Naing Htoo1 document the many
abuses committed by the military juntas that have ruled Burma since
1962-both in their efforts to cling to power, as well as in exploiting the
country's significant hydrocarbon reserves. Energy royalties contributed at
least U.S. $ 1 billion to the junta's coffers in 2006;2 and incidents of forced
labor and forced migration along the route of the Yadana gas pipeline are
well documented. 3 Similar dilemmas confront energy companies doing
t B.A. 2002, University of Toronto; M.Phil. 2004, University of Oxford; J.D. 2008, Yale
University. I am grateful for the insights of Brittan Heller, Dawn Yamane Hewett, and
Zachary Kaufman. Special thanks to Diana Rusk and the Editors of the Yale Human Rights
and Development Journal for their expert editing.
1. Matthew F. Smith & Naing Htoo, Energy Security: Security For Whom? Hydrocarbons and
Human Rights in Military-Ruled Burma, 11 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 217 (2008).
2. Hum. Rts. Watch, Burma: Targeted Sanctions Needed on Petroleum Industry (Nov. 19,
2007), http:/ / hrw.org/english/docs/2007/11/16/burmal7356_txt.htm.
3. Smith & Htoo, supra note 1.
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business in Sudan, where royalty payments are widely suspected of fueling
the atrocities in Darfur.'
This paper will offer some practical ideas on how best to address the
human rights dilemmas arising from energy exploration in regions of
concern, with a specific focus on Burma and Sudan. Starting from the
premise that energy exploration in regions of concern is inevitable, I reject
the pullout strategy championed by many human rights advocates as
ineffective. Instead, I argue that getting industry to take corporate social
responsibility (CSR) seriously offers the best prospects for improvement.
In the long run, this entails convincing energy companies from the
developing world, particularly from China, to start respecting human
rights in their overseas operations. This may sound like a tall order when
many such countries do not respect human rights at home, but there are
some reasons for optimism.
In the short run, however, the best available solution is to encourage
Western energy companies that have embraced the CSR agenda to invest in,
rather than pull out from, energy projects in regions of concern. This
suggestion may strike many in the human rights community as heretical,
but I argue that it is the only viable option in the difficult current
geopolitical context.
II. THE GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY
For better or worse, energy exploration in regions of concern will
continue for the foreseeable future, given the growing demand for oil at the
same time as supply is peaking.
Between 1996 and 2006, global oil consumption rose seventeen percent,
from 71.5 to 83.7 million barrels per day.5 Some thirty-eight percent of this
increase is attributable to China and India. 6 Meanwhile on the supply side,
we can see some of the implications of the controversial "peak oil"
hypothesis, which theorizes that more hydrocarbons have been pumped
out of the ground than still remain.7 Not only has the price of oil surged
from U.S. $ 12 a barrel in 1998 to over U.S. $ 140 today, but the rate of
discovery has also slowed considerably. 8 And of those large fields that
4. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, GETTING THE U.N. INTO DARFUR, AFRICA BRIEFING No. 43 (2006),
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4442.
5. BP PLC, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 2007 11 (2007), available at
http://www.bp.com/multipleimagesection.do?categoryld=9017892&contentld=7033503.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., DAVID L. GOODSTEIN, OUT OF GAS: THE END OF THE AGE OF OIL (2004).
8. Global proved oil reserves grew by 1.4% per annum between 1996 and 2006, compared
to 1.8% per annum in the previous decade. Even more striking is that proved oil reserves fell
for the first time in 2006, albeit modestly, from 1209.5 to 1208.2 billion barrels. See BP PLC,
Statistical Overview of World Energy 2007 Historical Data Tables (June 2007),
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp-internet/globalbp/globalbp-uk-english/reports-and-p
ublications/statistical-energy-review_2007/STAGING/ local-assets/ downloads/ spreadsheet
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remain highly productive, almost all are located in member states of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) where "National
Oil Companies" (NOCs) control most production.9
With large fields outside the OPEC countries mostly in decline,10 non-
OPEC energy companies are being forced to drill in increasingly
inhospitable environments -both in terms of geology and political
geography. Thus we see Chevron exploring for oil five miles beneath the
Gulf of Mexico,1 Shell investing nearly U.S. $ 13 billion in the Canadian tar
sands, 2 and, of course, Chevron and Total operating in pariah states like
Burma.
The problems of surging demand and shrinking supply are felt even
more acutely by developing countries that are latecomers to the
international energy game. Given the importance of oil to their economic
development, China and India have been busy creating state-owned
energy companies to "lock up" any available energy supplies. 3 Lacking
the technology of the Western-based "supermajors"' 4 to exploit reserves
located in difficult geological conditions, the path of least resistance for the
newcomers is to exploit conventional oil reserves in regions of concern.
Thus, it is no surprise that Chinese and Indian companies are among the
leading investors in both the Burmese and Sudanese oil patches. 5
III. THE TROUBLE WITH PULLING OUT
The recent rush of energy sector investment raises serious questions
about the effects and the effectiveness of the divestment campaigns that have
s/statistical-reviewjfull_report workbook_2007.xls (providing the raw data for these author-
derived figures).
9. See generally VALERIE MARCEL, OIL TITANS: NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN THE MIDDLE
EAST (2006).
10. Between 1996 and 2006, proved oil reserves in OECD countries fell from 112.9 to 79.8
billion barrels, while reserves in OPEC countries rose from 802.8 to 905.5 billion barrels. BP
PLC, supra note 5, at 6.
11. Amanda Griscom Little, Pumped Up: Chevron Drills Down 30,000 Feet to Tap Oil-Rich
Gulf of Mexico, WIRED, Aug. 21, 2007, http://www.wired.com/cars/energy/magazine/15-
09/mLjackrig.
12. Sonja Franklin, Shell Says Oil Sands Expansion Would Remain Viable With $30 Oil,
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 19, 2006,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601082&sid=aFZdV7RRIOc&refer=canada.
13. Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-
China Relations: Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? (Sept. 21, 2005)
(transcript available at http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm).
14. "Supermajor" is a term used to describe the six largest Western-based oil producers,
namely: Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil from the United States; Total from France; BP
from the UK; and the Anglo-Dutch Shell Group.
15. Of the twenty-six oil companies doing business in Burma, nationals of China, India,
and Burma have ownership ties to five companies each. HUM. RTS. WATCH, BURMA: FOREIGN
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been the main response of the international human rights community to
abuses occurring in regions of concern. All divestment campaigns use the
same means, though different campaigns vary in their ends. The common
means is to put pressure on companies operating in regions of concern by
encouraging investors to sell their shares. The ends are either to force the
company to pull out (divestment simpliciter), or to push it to improve its
human rights record (targeted divestment).
This paper takes issue with the first tactic, which must be judged a
failure. Despite the best efforts of divestment campaigners, Sudan's oil
output has risen from 5,000 to 397,000 barrels per day between 1996 and
2006,16 and we can only assume that royalty payments to Khartoum have
grown even more with the rise in oil prices.
In an era of surging demand, tight supply, and high prices, it would be
remarkable for an energy company to walk away from such an energy
bonanza. And yet one did: Canada's Talisman Energy left the Sudan in
2003 after a high-profile divestment campaign. Far from bringing
Khartoum to its knees, however, Talisman's pullout simply resulted in
India's ONGC Videsh buying Talisman's stake. Such reinvestment by
companies buying up the assets of others leaving over human rights
concern can hardly be described as a positive development.
Other than the reinvestment problem, divestment also leads to the
withdrawal of Western expatriate employees who can observe the human
rights situation on the ground. Just as Talisman employees were a
significant source of information on conditions in southern Sudan,17 so too
are Chevron and Total employees in Burma. It is interesting to note that
Smith and Htoo rely on data generated by Total regarding the number of
people displaced by the Yadana pipeline.'8 No such information ever
comes out of non-Western companies operating in these regions. 19
IV. ONE CHEER FOR WESTERN INVESTMENT
Voltaire's quip that "the perfect is the enemy of the good" is never
more true than when the evils we wish to avoid are grave, such as the
abuse of fundamental human rights. It is in this spirit that the international
human rights community should raise one cheer for investment by Western
companies in regions of concern. While they are hardly angels, there are
four reasons why such investment is preferable to divestment simpliciter.
16. BP PLC, supra note 5, at 8.
17. Talisman's 2002 CSR report discusses the company's role in assisting U.S. peace envoy
John Danforth during the process that lead to the signing of the 2002 Machakos Peace Protocol
ending the civil war in southern Sudan. See TALISMAN ENERGY, 2002 CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 9 (2002).
18. Smith & Htoo, supra note 1, at 226, n. 41.
19. Of the twenty-six energy companies identified by Human Rights Watch as doing
business in Burma, only the websites of Chevron and Total make any reference to the human
rights situation in that country.
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A. Stakeholders in Human Rights
Western companies are far more sensitive to human rights concerns
than their counterparts based elsewhere, as they have powerful
stakeholders at home that care about their human rights practices abroad.
We have already seen how the expatriate employees of Western oil
companies in Burma and Sudan do more for human rights than their non-
Western counterparts. More significantly, however, Western energy
companies - especially those that are vertically integrated- can be targeted
by boycotts at home when they abuse human rights abroad. Indeed, the
CSR movement gained prominence in the 1990s when consumers stopped
spending at a company's downstream retail operations to punish it for its
upstream human rights abuses. The 1995 boycott against Shell following
Nigeria's execution of the Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa is a leading
example of this phenomenon.
The risk of consumer or investor boycotts means that even hard-nosed
shareholders must be sensitive to the human rights practices of companies
in their portfolio, given that bad press about human rights can depress
share prices.20 Thus, targeted divestment campaigns, which pressure
companies to behave in a socially responsible manner, are a much more
effective means of promoting human rights on the ground than divestment
simpliciter campaigns, which simply lead to the reinvestment problem. To
be sure, the stakeholder pressure mechanism isn't perfect, otherwise there
wouldn't be allegations of abuses surrounding Chevron and Total's
operations in Burma. But there are other virtues to consider.
B. Human Rights Transparency
Compared to their non-Western counterparts, Western companies are
much more transparent in disclosing information about the human rights
consequences of their operations. It is no coincidence that, of all the energy
companies operating in Burma, only Chevron and Total address human
rights concerns on their websites and in their annual corporate reporting.2
One might be tempted to dismiss such efforts as self-serving public
relations material, but that is too glib. At the very least, the publication of
such material shows that Western companies are sufficiently concerned
about human rights to say something about the issue - in contrast to the
silence emanating from non-Western companies.
20. Although Talisman's CEO cited the discount on its share price as a rationale for
withdrawing from Sudan, the evidence of a statistical correlation between share prices and
human rights practices is weak at best. See TALISMAN ENERGY, supra note 17, at 3; The Next
Question: Does CSR Work? ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, special report, at 8, 10.
21. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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C. Financial Transparency
Though they are far from squeaky clean, two recent developments
have made Western energy companies considerably less corrupt than their
non-Western peers. The first is the adoption of the Anti-Bribery
Convention by the OECD in 1998,22 which requires signatories to adopt
laws akin to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act23 criminalizing the
bribing of foreign officials The second is the launch of the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2002, whose goal is to make
public all payments made by extractive sector companies to host country
governments. To be sure, EITI implementation requires host government
participation and neither Burma nor Sudan show any promising signs, but
at least the six Western supermajors have endorsed the EITI principles,2 4
which is more than can be said of most non-American and non-European
energy companies.25
D. Extraterritorial Law
Just as the supermajors are susceptible to home country penalties for
corruption abroad, they are also subject to extraterritorial laws on human
rights. The most famous such law is the U.S. Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA)
under which Unocal, Chevron's predecessor-in-interest in Burma, was
sued for abuses relating to the Yadana pipeline.26 That this lawsuit was
ultimately settled 27 shows how bargaining in the shadow of extraterritorial
law can act as a check on the human rights practices of Western companies
operating abroad.
V. NURTURING RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE STAKEHOLDERS
These Western virtues notwithstanding, oil companies from China,
India, and other developing countries are not likely to leave regions of
concern such as Burma and Sudan anytime soon, for all the reasons
described in Part II above. Accordingly, the ultimate solution for
mitigating the human rights consequences of energy extraction in regions
22. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43.
23. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-78ff (2000).
24. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Supporters-Companies (Oct. 21, 2007),
http://eitransparency.org/node/218.
25. The two non-American and non-European energy companies that support EITI are
Mexico's Pemex and Brazil's Petrobras, neither of which has significant operations outside its
home country. See id.
26. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), affd, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
27. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
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of concern is to make non-Western companies behave in a socially
responsible manner.
This, of course, will be no mean feat-for the opposite of the reasons
why Western companies have become sensitive to human rights concerns
in the last decade. The basic problem is that most non-Western companies
do not hail from societies with strong human rights cultures, where
multiple stakeholders work to ensure that they behave ethically while
doing business abroad. Thus, it is not very likely that governments such as
China and Malaysia, which are not exactly champions of human rights
protection at home, will pass extraterritorial legislation similar to the Alien
Tort Claims Act. Substantially the same analysis applies to human rights
and financial transparency measures: one can hardly expect countries to
take up the cause of good governance abroad when their own houses are in
disarray.
Nor can much be expected of civil society within these countries in
terms of generating demand for socially responsible corporate behavior
abroad. For starters, in authoritarian countries like China, the freedom of
speech required to sustain a dialogue on human rights simply does not
exist. And even in democracies such as India, the overwhelming
preoccupation with economic development means that human rights
concerns will play second fiddle to the gargantuan task of alleviating
poverty.
Yet another problem is that, to the extent that social responsibility is
based on a firm's calculation of its enlightened economic self-interest, the
business case for respecting human rights is not obvious to companies
headquartered in non-Western countries. To the extent that non-Western
energy companies are monopolists at home, consumers can't vote with
their feet as they did during the Shell boycott. Nor is there much of a
possibility for shareholder activism when most such companies are
majority or entirely state-owned.
The extra-territorial application of U.S. law might once have served as
a check against abusive behavior, but an unintended consequence of the
post-Enron corporate governance reforms has been to drive many non-
Western companies beyond Uncle Sam's writ. The onerous financial
reporting requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have led many
developing-world companies to float their shares in London or Hong
Kong, rather than in New York.28 As a result, U.S. courts have lost an
important jurisdictional hook over foreign companies, 29 which is
28. In 2006, the New York Stock Exchange was relegated to third place in Initial Public
Offering (IPO) activity, behind the Hong Kong and London bourses. ERNST & YOUNG,
GLOBALIZATION: GLOBAL IPO TRENDS REPORT 2007 5, 13 (2007).
29. The Second Circuit has ruled that listing on a U.S. stock exchange does not constitute
sufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for an ATCA
suit. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 97-8 (2d Cir. 2000).
2008]
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problematic given that many non-Western energy companies don't
otherwise have contacts with this country 0
Finally, we must also contend with the fact that many developing
countries see their energy companies as foreign policy instruments in an
incipient 21st century great power competition. 31 This is especially true of
China's "go out" strategy of using no-strings-attached resource deals as the
first step in cultivating political and economic ties to draw a country into
Beijing's sphere of influence. 32 This dynamic is plain to see in Burma,
where Chinese and Indian companies act as proxies for their governments
in trying to prevent this strategic state from tilting too far to one side.33
Judging from recent news reports, China seems to be winning this
beauty contest. Not only are the two countries cooperating on the
construction of Chinese naval bases on the Bay of Benga 34 and an oil
pipeline linking this coast to China's Hunan province,35 but hundreds of
thousands of Chinese businesspeople have flooded into Burma in recent
years, where they play a dominant role in the country's economy.3 6
These developments pose risks to China's bottom line in Burma that
may well make it worth its while to start taking human rights seriously.
The relevant risk is of backlash-both against China's economic interests
and the Chinese themselves.
History provides plenty of examples of backlashes against foreign
resource extraction companies that are seen as too cozy with illegitimate
governments. When political change comes to Burma -and it is a question
of when, not if-the Chinese may well find themselves in the same position
as the Western oil companies that were driven out of Iran following the
Islamic Revolution of 1979. 37 As for ethnic backlash, Amy Chua contends
that "[t]he situation developing in Burma today is dangerously similar to
the one that sent up much of Jakarta in flames" in 1998, when the
30. For example, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) is listed on the NYSE
but does not conduct any other business in the U.S., while India's ONGC Videsh neither
trades on the NYSE nor does any business in this country.
31. See, e.g., Parag Khanna, Waving Goodbye to Hegemony, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html.
32. See generally PETER C. EVANS & ERICA S. DOWNS, BROOKINGS INST. POLICY BRIEF No.
154, UNTANGLING CHINA'S QUEST FOR OIL THROUGH STATE-BACKED FINANCIAL DEALS 2006,
available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2006/05china-evans/pb154.pdf.
33. Democratic India's cozy relationship with the Burmese junta draws particular ire from
human rights activists. See, e.g., Meenakshi Ganguly, India and Burma: Time to Choose,
OPENDEMOCRACY, Jan. 14, 2008,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/conflicts/indiaburma-time-to-choose.
34. Geoffrey York, The Junta's Enablers, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 6, 2007, at A22.
35. China and Myanmar, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2008, at 45.
36. Mark Landler, For Many Burmese, China is an Unwanted Ally, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2001,
at Al.
37. See MARCEL, supra note 9, at 25, 30, 33-4.
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prosperous ethnic Chinese minority became the scapegoat of choice for
Indonesians ruined by the Asian financial crisis.3
Given these risks, Chinese energy companies doing business in Burma,
which are overwhelmingly creatures of the Chinese state, are well advised
to improve their human rights records. There are encouraging early signs
that some Chinese companies are starting to embrace the ethos of corporate
responsibility. In 2006, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC)
issued its first-ever social responsibility report.39 The report was prepared
to the international standards devised by the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) and the International Petroleum Industry Environmental
Conservation Association (IPIECA). The GRI requires companies to report
on nine human rights indicators, while the IPIECA demands seven. CNPC
only chose to report on two indicators (relating to forced labor and the
training of security personnel), but it is surely an encouraging sign that a
company owned by the Chinese government is now openly discussing at
least some aspects of its human rights practices.4°
VI. CONCLUSION
To some, the pragmatic approach this paper advocates to deal with the
human rights dilemmas posed by resource extraction in regions of concern
may seem unappealing, for it lacks the expressive moral force of shunning
those who do not respect human rights. There may well be times and
places where such a dramatic response is appropriate, but my hope is that
this paper will lead us to weigh the costs of that our moralism will impose
upon those we seek to help.
38. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE 47 (2003).
39. CHINA NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, 2006 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
REPORT 2006, available at
http://www.cnpc.com.cn/ Resource/ eng/ img/SocialResponsibilityReport/csr~jeport_2006.p
df.
40. Id. at 39, 65-66.
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